EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
PubliBhed monthly during the Academic Year by the Y o na- Jou-nrl Co., Ire.,
Edited by Studento nnd members of the Faculty of tho Yalo I.= O chooL
BUBSCRIPTION PRICE, C4M A YEAR SINL COrIma. C3 CIITO
Canadian subscription price is 5.00 a year; foreign, $5.m n year.
EDITORIAL BOARD
BENJAMIN NASSAUEdior-n-Chief
MINIER SARGENT ALFRED MITCHELL BINGHAM
Case and Comment Editor Secretary
GEORGE HATHAWAY DESSION GEORGE NEBOLMINE
Managing Editor Books Review Editor
HARVfy DUDLEY LEUn
Business Manager
JuLIus G. DAY, JR. ELLIOTT R. KTZ
CLARENCE 0. DiIMocK I. OscAR LEvtE
WILLIAM F. HAuTON, JR. EDWARD J. MIcALENNEY
GARRETT S. HOAG CHARLES J. LcCAuTHY
BERNARD C. KANERmAN DIYER D. MER.Mi
JOHN WALLIS
The JouflNAL consistently alms to print matter rhicli presents a vlew of mcrit
on a subject deserving attention. Beyond this no collective reponaibllty 13 aszmed
for matter signed or unsigned.
CONTRIBUTORS OF LEADING ARTICLES IN THIS ISSUE
JULIUS HENRY COHEN has been a member af the New York Bar since 1897.
He is counsel for the Port Authority of New York and the New York
Chamber of Commerce and is the author of numerous boolm and law
review articles.
WILLIA 0. DOUGLAS is an Associate Professor of Law, Yale University.
He is author of Vicarious Liability and Administration of Ris (1929)
38 YALE L. J. 584, 720.
CARROL Il. SHANKS is an Associate Professor of Law, Yale University. He
is a member of the New York Bar, and was engaged in practice in
1925-1929.
GEOFFREY MAY is a member of the Inner Temple, and is engaged in legal
research at the University of London. He is author of LIARIAGs LAws
Aw DECISIONs IN THE UNIrnD STATES (1929) and of a study for the
Harvard Law School's Survey of Crime and Criminal Justice.
FEDERAL CONTROL OF RADIO BROADCASTING
That the federal government must control the broadcasting
situation is generally admitted. The tremendous present im-
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portance and future possibilities of the radio,' the limitations
upon the number of persons who may broadcast simultaneously
without causing a chaos of interference,2 and the fact that radio
waves are not confined within the bounds of a single state or
nation,; make obvious the necessity of a unified federal control.4
But the difficulty of employing the usual legal tools to cope with
a situation involving such unique concepts and such unusual
problems is equally obvious. This is well illustrated in the at-
tempt to solve the first question which presents itself-that of
determining which stations shall have the privilege of using
the limited facilities for broadcasting.5
'According to a nationwide survey conducted in May, 1928, there were at
that time nearly 12,000,000 radio receiving sets in use serving an audience
of more than 40,000,000 people. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL RADIO COM-
MISSION (1928) 22.
2A knowledge of certain scientific principles is essential to an adequate
understanding of the problems of radio control. In brief, two stations in
the same locality may transmit electromagnetic waves through the "ether,"
without interfering with each other, only by varying the length of the
wave and the number (or frequency) of waves per second. Frequencies
thus separated from each other are known as channels. By interna-
tional agreement and national legislation the available channels, which
are definitely limited in number, have been apportioned among the va-
rious types of services, such as the marine service, the transoceanic serv-
ice, amateurs, broadcasting, etc. In the United States there are avail-
able for broadcasting only ninety channels. While scientific progress is to
be expected there is little hope at present that it will furnish a means by
which two stations may broadcast upon the same channel or that it will
provide additional channels in the broadcast band. In fact, the develop-
ment of television, which requires "wider" channels than ordinary broad-
casting, would materially reduce the number of available channels. A
system of allocating stations so as to make the best possible use of these
limited facilities obviously involves intricate engineering problems which
can be solved only by experts.
For a full discussion of the scientific principles of broadcasting, see
HEARINGS ON H. R. 15430, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929) 359 et seq.; A. B. A.,
COMMITTEE ON RADIo LAW REP. (1929) pt. 3; United States v. American
Bond & Mortgage Co., infra note 17.
3 Conferences held at Berlin in 1903 and 1906, at London in 1912, and
at Washington in 1927, have drawn up regulations covering various inter-
national problems. The United States has also participated in a con-
vention at Mexico City in 1924 and in an agreement with Canada and Cuba
in March, 1929. See Davis, International Radio Relations 1928) 16 GEo. L.
REV. 400; A. B. A., COMMITTEE ON RADIO LAW REP. (1929) pt. 12; Stewart,
The International Radiotelegraph Conference of Washington (1928) 22
AM. J. INT. LAw 28; Stewart, Recent Radio Legislation (1929) 23 AM. POL.
Sci. REv. 421; DAVIS, LAW OF RADIO (1927) 175-185.
4 See Lee, Power of Congress over Radio Conmunication (1925) 11 A.
B. A. J. 19; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 4TH NATIONAL RADIO CONFERENCE (1925)
8; Chamberlain, Radio Act of 1927 (1927) 13 A. B. A. J. 343.
5 Problems involving the question of what a radio station may broadcast
are even more difficult of solution. These have as yet received little atten-
tion except in so far as they are involved in the first question. Section 28
COMMENTS
The earliest attempt at regulation of radio was the Act of
1912, providing that no person should operate any radio ap-
paratus without a license, revocable for cause, granted by the
Secretary of Commerce.6 It was under this act, passed when
broadcasting was unknown and radio was little more than a
safety device for shipping, that the broadcasting industry de-
veloped.T Efforts of Secretary of Commerce Hoover to regulate
the situation under the act were considerably hampered by a
decision in 1923 that it was mandatory upon him to issue a
license to every applicant.8 A certain amount of unofficial con-
trol was made effective through a series of annual National
Radio Conferences called by Secretary Hoover in Washington
But in 1926, after a second adverse decision to the effect that
the Secretary of Commerce had no power under the Act of 1912
to restrict the time of operation or frequency of any station, 0
there came a period of unregulated confusion generally kmown
as "the breakdown of the law." 12
of the Radio Act of 1927, infra note 12, expressly allows the licensing au-
thority no power of censorship. Obviously, however, in granting or deny-
ing licenses the Federal Radio Commission exercises an indirect censorship
of great importance. The solution of these problems remains largely for
the future.
637 STAT. 302 (1912), 47 U. S. C. §§ 51-63 (1926). The act also con-
tained general regulatory provisions. While there was no provision as to
the term of the licenses, the Secretary of Commerce made a practice of
issuing them for three months only. In view of the later decisions under
the act this was done quite without authority. See 35 Or. ATr'Y GEN. 12G
(1926).
7 Since the establishment in 1920 of KDKA, the first broadcasting sta-
tion, the growth of broadcasting has been phenomenal. In eight years an
industry with an annual business of $500,000,000 was created. See TIM
RADio INDusTRY (Harvard Business School Lectures 1928) 106 et seq.
s Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 Fed. 1003 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1923).
9 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL RADio CONFERENCES (Gov. Printing Of-
fice 1922-1925).
20 United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F. (2d) 614 (N. D. Ill. 1926).
The act was interpreted in the same way by the Attorney Gencral. 29
Or. ATT'Y GEN. 579 (1912); 35 Or. ATT'Y GEN. 126 (1926).
11 In July 1926 there were 528 broadcasting stations in operation. When
the Radio Act of 1927 was passed in February, this number had increased
to 732. Stations changed wave lengths at will without regard to interfer-
ence with each other or with Canadian stations operating on the channels
assigned to them. See A. B. A., Commrrns oN RADIo LAw RFu. (1929)
pt. 4; DAvis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 54. For several Eessions it was found
impossible to get a new bill through Congress In the meantime, in Decem-
ber, 1926, Congress passed a joint resolution limiting licenses to ninety
days and providing that no original license or renewal of a license should
be issued until the applicant executed in writing "a waiver of any right or
any claim to any right, as against the United States, to any wave length
or to the use of the ether in radio transmission because of previous licento
to use the same or because of the use thereof." 44 STAT. 917 (1926), 47
19291 247
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Congress finally passed the long overdue Radio Act of 1927 12
providing for the creation of a Federal Radio Commission with
full authority to fix wave lengths, powers, and times of opera-
tion.13 All stations were required to obtain new licenses,
limited to three years, which were to be granted by the Com-
mission if the "public interest, convenience, and necessity"
would be served thereby. 14  Since 1927, the Commission, handi-
capped at first by lack of funds, instability of personnel, and
fear of constitutional difficulties, has succeeded in bringing about
some sort of order."
As had been foreseen by Congress, it was not long before the
Commission became involved in legal troubles over "due proc-
U. S. C. § 51a (1928). This resolution was repealed by the Radio Act of
1927, inf'a note 12.
1244 STAT. 1162 (1927), 47 U. S. C. §§ 81-119 (1928).
23Ibid. §§ 3, 4, 47 U. S. C. at §§ 83, 84.
14 Ibid. §§ 9, 11, 47 U. S. C. at §§ 89, 91. The general regulatory powers
of the Commission were limited to a year, after which they were to be
transferred to the Secretary of Commerce. The Commission was then to
retain merely jurisdiction of an appellate nature. Ibid. § 5. But the Com-
mission being unable to set things in order within the year, the time limit
has been twice extended. See inf'a note 15.
Where an application for a license is refused, an appeal is allowed to the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia; where a license is revoked,
an appeal is allowed also to the district courts. The reviewing court is
given the power "to alter or revise the decision appealed from and enter
such judgment as to it may seem just." Ibid. § 16. In the case of the
district courts this would seem to be an improper delegation of administra-
tive powers. See Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428, 43
Sup. Ct. 445 (1923) ; Note (1929) 42 HARv. L. REV. 948.
15 The first action of the Commission was to remove summarily to other
channels 41 stations which were on, or overlapping, the wavelengths as-
signed to Canada. After public hearings in March, 1927, the Commission
published an order attempting to reassign frequencies and powers to all
stations so as to cause as little interference as possible. The result was
not generally considered successful. During the winter of 1927 and the
spring of 1928 the Commission continued its efforts to achieve order by con-
solidation and rearrangement of stations, generally stopping short, how-
ever, of actually taking stations off the air. On March 28, 1928, Congress
passed the Davis Amendment extending the life of the Commission for
another year, limiting licenses to a term of three months, and providing
for equality of broadcasting service among the five zones created by the
Act of 1927. 45 STAT. 373 (1928), 47 U. S. C. Surr. §§ 63 (1)-03 (16 ,)
(1928). In May, 1928, the Commission issued an order requiring 164 sta-
tions to make a showing before the Commission that their continued opera-
tion would serve the "public interest, convenience, or necessity." After
hearings, 62 of these stations were refused new licenses. During July and
August, 1928, a completely new allocation in compliance with the Davis
Amendment was worked out. This went into effect in November, 1928. In
the spring of 1929 the powers of the Commission were again extended to
December 31, 1929. Congress has as yet taken no further action. See
ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE FEDERAL RADio COMMISSION (1927, 1928).
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ess." In Gewral Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission,"
the General Electric Company asserted that it was being wrong-
fully deprived of its property rights by a refusal of the Com-
mission to permit the operation of station WGY after sunset
in California. The Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia,
while it did not expressly pass upon the contention, held that
the limitation was not "reasonable" and did not serve the "pub-
lic interest, convenience, or necessity." But in United States
v. A-merican Bond and Mortgage Co.,T an injunction was
granted by a federal district court of Illinois restraining the de-
fendants from broadcasting after the Commission had refused
to renew their license. The court ruled that Congress had power
to regulate broadcasting under the commerce clause of the Con-
stitution, that it had not exceeded the legitimate bounds of its
regulatory power in the Act of 1927, and that the standard of
"public interest, convenience, and necessity" was not so vague as
to be an invalid delegation of legislative power. A third case
of interest, Technical Radio Laboratory v. Federal Radio Con-
mission,"' involved a somewhat different situation. Here the
station which had been refused a renewal of its license had re-
ceived its first license after the Resolution of December 8,
1926,19 providing for a waiver of all claims to the use of the
ether in radio transmission. The Court of Appeals of the Dis-
trict of Columbia, in upholding the order of the Commission,
declared definitely that "the only property right which was ac-
quired by appellant in the use of the ether as a medium of
communication was such as was granted to it by the terms of
its license" under the Act of 1927.20 As yet no decision under
16 31 F. (2d) 630 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1929). On Oct. 14, 1929, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari. The main question that will be argued, however,
involves only the powers of the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia. N. Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1929, at 36. There is considerable doubt as to
the power of the Supreme Court to take jurisdiction over the case. Keller
v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra note 14.
1731 F. (2d) 448 (N. D. 1ll. 1929). This case has also been appealed.
N. Y. Herald-Tribune, Nov. 3, 1929, § 9, at 1.
18 U. S. Daily, Nov. 7, 1929, at 2242 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1929).
19 Supra note 11.
20 There have been several other cases involving the Act of 1927. In
White v. Federal Radio Commission, 29 F. (2d) 113 (N. D. Ill. 1928), a
temporary injunction to enjoin enforcement of an order of the Commission
was denied. The court held that the regulation of radio was a valid exer-
cise of the power of Congress under the commerce clause and that the con-
struction of the plaintiff's plant and operation under licenses prior to 1927
"did not create property rights which may be asserted against the regulatory
power of the ,United States, if that power is properly exercised."
In a case recently decided by the Court of Appeals of the District of Col-
umbia, the Commission's order reducing the time of operation of P/NYC,
a municipal station in New York City, was upheld. The court "did not
agree with the contention" that the "appellant had acquired a property
1929]
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the Act of 1927 has been rendered by the United States Supreme
Court.
These cases throw considerable light upon the approach of
the courts to the puzzling problem of adapting customary legal
forms to the strange concepts and problems of broadcasting. A
common method has been to say that the government "owns the
ether" or the channels in the ether so that it may exclude all
others at will. For a long time such an approach was an
idge fixe in the debates of Congress. 2' It has, indeed, the ad-
vantage of simplicity. Unfortunately there is considerable
doubt among scientists as to the "existence" of the ether."
Moreover, it has been argued that, even if the ether could be
owned, there is no constitutional provision under which the gov-
ernment could claim title, but that, as in the case of navigable
waters, it would belong rather to the states.23  While perhaps
neither of these objections would prove fatal if the fiction were
necessary, the idea has not been seriously advocated of late and
was not considered in the present cases.
Perhaps the more rational way of approaching the situation
is to disregard the mechanics of radio waves and concentrate
upon the result. Broadcasting may be considered as the busi-
ness of communicating ideas and entertainment. In the United
States, this business has developed almost entirely as a private
commercial enterprise.2 4 It is not surprising, therefore, that
right to operate its station full time, and that the restrictions imposed by
the Commission's present order amounted to a taking of appellant's prop-
erty without due process of law." City of New York v. Federal Radio
Commission, U. S. Daily, Nov. 6, 1929, at 2226. The same court has also
upheld a decision of the Commission refusing to renew the licenses of the
portable stations. Carrell v. Federal Radio Commission, U. S. Daily, Nov.
6, 1929, at 2226. But in another case it overruled an order refusing to
renew a construction permit already twice extended. Richmond Develop-
ment Corp. v. Federal Radio Commission, U. S. Daily, Nov. 7, 1929, at 2242.
2167 CONG. REC. 5500, 12351 (1926) ; 68 CONG. Ec. 2588 (1927). In 1926
the preamble of a bill introduced into the House declared that "the ether
is the inalienable possession of the people." See Interim Report on Radio
Legislation (1926) 12 A. B. A. J. 848.
22 EDDINGTON, NATURE OF THE PHYSICAL WO=w (1929) 31. Perhaps a
more scientific analysis would be to say that for purposes of transmitting
radio waves the government owns all the land and waters of the country.
But the objection that there is no authority for such a declaration may be
made here also.
23 DAvis, op. cit. supra note 3, at 16.
24 It has been estimated that 957 of the broadcasting stations in the
United States are run by commercial concerns. Some revenue is derived
from the sale of advertising time, but few stations seem to be making
profits by this means. Losses in operating expenses are generally charged
up to publicity. The recent growth of chain broadcasting indicates also
difficulty in providing satisfactory programs. The present condition seems
somewhat unstable. Future growth may well be away from stations oper-
ated by commercial enterprise. Welch, Who Will Regulate Broadcast-
[Vol. 39
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the courts, in facing this situation with the traditional tools at
their disposal, have elected to treat broadcasting as a private
business to be regulated under the commerce clause."
The question which next arises is whether the regulatory
technique provided by the commerce clause is capable of achiev-
ing satisfactory results when applied to the peculiar problems
of radio. Broadcasting possesses many of the familiar features
of a public utility involving a natural monopoly. Yet it is
unique in that the standard of the service a station may give
is indefinite and flexible. For example, the standards of a rail-
road are relatively constant and can be achieved by one company
almost as well as by another; but the possibilities of a broad-
casting station are so much greater that a new applicant can
often offer better service than his predecessor. Coupled with
this is the fact that the investment in a radio station is relatively
small,6 and that there are constantly increasing numbers de-
sirous of using the same facilities. The result is that broad-
casting presents a situation where the public benefit will often
demand that an existing station be curtailed or entirely elim-
inated in favor of a new one.27  This is a condition found in
ing and How (1929) 3 PuB. UTrr. FoRrNIGHmTY 90; EAnlNGS oN H. R.
15430, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. (1929) pa-mim.
This affords an interesting comparison with the situation in Europa
where the problem of control is largely solved by government ownership
and operation. In some countries broadcasting stations are operated en-
tirely by the government as a public service. In Germany, Austria, and
Czechoslovakia, the stations are ran by companies, commercial in form,
in which the government holds a controlling interest. The British Broad-
casting Company, operating eight stations in England, is under the direct
control of the Post Office but is not merged with it. The reason for govern-
ment ownership in Europe seems to be partly the greater prevalence of the
government in industry and partly the fact that there is not a sufficiently
large market in one language to make a station pay in publicity. Through-
out the continent receiving sets are taxed to support the expanse of operat-
ing stations. In Japan receiving sets are tuned to only one station to Nwhic,
the listener pays a fee. ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (14th ed. 1929) tit.
Broadcasting.; Welch, op. cit. supra.
25 It has been suggested that power to control radio communication could
be derived also from the postal power, the treaty power, or the power to
maintain an army and navy. Lee, op. cit. supra note 4. There never has
been any doubt but that the power to regulate radio comes under the com-
merce clause. Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 F. (2d) 787 (E. D. Ky. 1927);
White v. Federal Radio Commission, supra note 20; zee Note (1928) 26
MIcH. L. REv. 919.
2 6 The dost of radio stations has been estimated as a "few thousand dol-
lars" for a 100-watt station, $50,000 to $60,000 for a 500-watt station,
$150,000 to $175,000 for a 5000-watt station, and $300,000 to $400,000 for
a 50,000-watt station. HEnAnNGS oN H. R. 15430, 70th Cong. 2d Sez-.
(1929) 295.
27 See PaocEmINGS OF THE 4TH NAT'L RADIO CONFEnENCE, 1925 (Gov.
Printing Office 1926) R.
1929]
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no other case of regulation of a private enterprise. And it is
here that the main constitutional difficulties arise.
The Act of 1927 attempts to meet the situation by limiting
the term of the licenses 28 and providing that "the license shall
not vest in the licensee any right to operate the station nor any
right in the use of frequencies or wave length designated in
the license beyond the term thereof." 20 These are probably
as severe conditions as have ever been imposed upon any "legiti-
mate business." Yet, in view of the necessity for regulation,
it seems likely that they would be held constitutional in the
case of stations first licensed under the Act of 1927.10 Indeed,
the Technical Radio Laboratoj 31 case seems to point in that
direction.
The present difficulties, however, arise from the fact that
most stations came into existence under the Act of 1912.32 The
licensing provisions of that act, as we have seen, amounted
to little more than mere registration. Many individuals and
corporations invested money in a station, appropriated a wave
length, and started broadcasting, much as they would engage
in any other legitimate business. When, therefore, the Federal
Radio Commission curtails the hours of operation or refuses to
renew the license of such stations, they invariably contend that
they are being deprived of their property without due process
of law. The claim to "property rights" may be either in the
use of the physical apparatus or in the right to freedom from
2844 STAT. 1162, § 9 (1927), 47 U. S. C. § 89 (1928). And see supra
note 15.
29 Ibid. § 11, 47 U. S. C. at § 91. Section 1 stated that the act was in-
tended "to maintain the control of the United States over all channels
of interstate and foreign radio transmission; and to provide for the use
of such channels, but not the ownership thereof, by individuals, firms, or
corporations, for limited periods of time, under licenses granted by Federal
authority, and no such license shall be construed to create any right, be-
yond the terms, conditions, and periods of the license."
30 See Zollmann, Radio Act of 1927 (1927) 11 MARQUETTE L. REv. 121;
Current Legislation (1927) 27 COL. L. REV. 727.
31 Supra note 18.
32 Section 5 of the Radio Act of 1927 provided: "No station license shall
be granted by the commission or the Secretary of Commerce until the appli-
cant therefor shall have signed a waiver of any claim to the use of any
particular frequency or wave length or of the ether as against the regula-
tory power of the United States because of the previous use of the same,
whether by license or otherwise." Cf. Resolution of Dec. 8, 1926, supra note
11. But if this is meant as a waiver of the right to object to a decision of
the licensing authority on the ground of due process, or to consent to con-
fiscation of the "property right" in a wave length, it is unquestionably un-
constitutional. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Commission, 271
U. S. 583, 46 Sup. Ct. 605 (1926).
[Vol. 39
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interference by subsequently established stations. 33 While never
expressly admitting the existence of any such property rights,
the decisions involving these stations have apparently recognized
the claim by implication.34  Indeed, unless one adopts the sug-
gestion of "the government ownership of the ether," an admis-
sion of property rights seems inevitable. It is not, however,
necessarily an impediment to federal regulation under the com-
merce clause. The question is whether it is a reasonable use
of the regulatory power to deprive stations of such property
rights without compensation when demanded by the "public
interest, convenience and necessity."
The courts seek the answer to this question in the nebulous
realms of police power. For, while it is commonly said that the
federal government lacks "police power," yet whenever it exerts
any of the powers conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Fifth Amendment imposes no greater limitation upon such
33 The basis for this claim rests largely upon the decision in Tribune Co.
v. Oak Leaves Broadcasting Co. (unreported), 68 CoNG. REC. 216 (1921)
(C. C. Cook Co. Ill. 1926) where an injunction was granted restraining
one station from broadcasting on the same wave length used by a prior
station. By analogy to rights in prior appropriation of water, in protection
granted telephone companies against electrical interference, and in trade
names, good will, and unfair competition, it was held that, as between two
stations, priority of time created superiority of right. See Taugher, Law
of Radio Communication with Particular Reference to a Propcrty Right in
a Radio Wave-Length (1928) 12 M.AQUETTS L. REv. 179, 299.
34 The decision in General Electric Co. v. Federal Radio Commission,
supra note 16, was based not only on the fact that the order of the Com-
mission did not serve the public interest, convenience, or necessity but that
it was an unreasonable restriction. In United States v. American Bond &
Mortgage Co., supra note 17, the court rested its decision on the authority
of cases showing "the extent to which a state in exercise of police power
may prescribe regulations which have the effect of exclusion from or limita-
tion of privileges existing by common right, contract, charter, grant, or
statute, and enforce uncompensated obedience thereto." The court also raid:
"Just what is the property right which is claimed for the broadcaster
when it is subjected to analysis? When we speak of wave lengths or fre-
quencies we are dealing with intangible things, about which we really know
nothing at all, except as we perceive the effect produced in an electrical
device. . . . In one aspect the waves may be treated as intruders. What-
ever rights may exist among these intruders in their relations with each
other, there certainly is no property right which can be asserted against
the right of those upon whom the intrusion is made to have the intruders
come 'by cold gradation and well balanced form' and not in a mob. In the
very nature of things there can be no right to the use of any particular
frequency or wave length, or of the ether as against the legitimate exercise
of the regulatory power of the United States."
But this last sentence is meaningless, as obviously no right is -alid
against the legitinmate exercise of the regulatory power. Cf. White v. Fed-
eral Radio Commission, supra note 20.
19291
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powers than does the Fourteenth Amendment upon state power.35
So while no express authority may be found, the courts at least
do not lack analogies. Thus, the taking of property rights with-
out compensation has been held justifiable in cases where the
government has forced a company licensed to build a bridge
to alter the bridge after it had become an obstruction to navi-
gation; 36 where improvements in navigation have destroyed
privately owned structures; 37 where excess profits have been
recaptured from the railroads; 38 where zoning laws have re-
duced the value of real estate; 39 where prohibition laws,40 pure
food laws, 41 the White Slave Law,42 and others possessing a
moral or sanitary tinge have invaded interests in established
businesses. 43 In United States v. American Bond and Mortgage
Co.,4" the court included the radio situation within such pre-
cedents. There the general power to exclude a station from the
air in the public interest was held to be "well within the regula-
tory power of the United States." The decision in the General
Electric case,45 however, casts some doubt upon how far the
courts intend to allow the Federal Radio Commission to go in its
regulation. 6
35 Cf. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S. 146, 156, 40 Sup.
Ct. 106, 108 (1919); United States v. American Bond & Mortgage Co.,
supra note 17, at 455.
36 Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U. S. 409, 37 Sup. Ct. 158
(1917); Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 27 Sup. Ct. 367
(1907). But cf. Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S.
312, 13 Sup. Ct. 622 (1893).
37United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U. S. 53, 33
Sup. Ct. 667 (1913); Gibson v. United States, 166 U. S. 269, 17 Sup. Ct.
578 (1897). But where there has been a direct invasion of the plaintiff's
land by water it has been held that compensation must be paid. Punipelly
v. Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 166 (U. S. 1871); United States v. Cress, 243
U. S. 316, 37 Sup. Ct. 380 (1917).
38 Dayton Goose Creek Ry. v. United States, 263 U. S. 456, 44 Sup. Ct.
169 (1924). The Adamson Act, creating an eight hour day for railroad
employees, was upheld in Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332, 37 Sup. Ct. 298
(1917). And railroads have often been forced to eliminate grade crossings.
Erie R. R. v. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 254 U. S. 394. 41
Sup. Ct. 169 (1921).
39 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 Sup. Ct. 114
(1926).
40 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273 (1887).
4," Hipolite Egg Co. v. United States, 220 U. S. 45, 31 Sup. Ct. 364 (1911);
Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 8 Sup. Ct. 992 (1888).
- Hoke v. United States, 227 U. S. 308, 33 Sup. Ct. 281 (1913).
43 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 9 Sup. Ct. 231 (1889); New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm., 197 U. S. 453, 25 Sup. Ct. 471
(1905) ; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. 118 (1920);
Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1872).
-Supra note 17.
45Supra note 16.
46 Possibly the problem could be approached through the medium of a
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The courts would undoubtedly have had less difficulty with
the problem of control through the commerce power had the
Radio Act of 1927 included some provision for compensation
to stations taken off the air. This, indeed, had been recom-
mended by the Committee on Radio Law of the American Bar
Association. 7 But the provision was not incorporated in the
act, and to overturn the act for this reason would cause needless
confusion. Moreover, it may well be questioned whether the
loss to a station is such as to make compensation feasible. Few,
if any, stations as now conducted make actual profits.' The
physical property of a station, which is not to be confiscated, can
be sold or retained until the station is again qualified to broad-
cast. The principal loss to a station, then, is loss of "good will"
-that is, loss of advertising. Not a little difficulty would arise
in any attempt to evaluate such a loss, especially if the limitation
was only partial. Moreover, it is somewhat doubtful if a station
should be allowed to impose a demand for compensation for
future loss of advertising as a bar to regulation in behalf of
the greatest public interest."
It would seem, then, that a control adequate to meet the
present problems of broadcasting can be made effective through
the medium of the commerce clause. But the General Electric
case indicates that the courts will proceed carefully where the
business affected with a public interest. Broadcasting possesse3 enough of
the elements commonly required so that the courts may label it as such if
they so desire. It is a business of greatest importance to the public; it is
not one where competition will protect the public interest; it may even
be said that it has been "granted" or "devoted" to the use of the public.
Cf. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, 262 U. S. 522, 43
Sup. Ct. 630 (1923); Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426
(1927); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct. 545 (1928); ree
Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton (1927) 27 Co& L.4
REV. 769; Comment (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 225, 232; Comment (1929) 39
YALE L. T. 256. But see DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 3, at 92 ct ccq.
Yet, though the courts may get over the first hurdle and find that broad-
casting is a business affected with a public interest, they do not appear ever
to have used the doctrine to justify such a strict regulation as the re-
quirements of radio would seem to demand. The device was used originally
for fixing rates. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876). And the regulation
permitted under it has never proceeded much beyond this. See Wolff
Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial Relations, cupra at 539, 43 Sup. Ct. at
634.
47 Interim Report on Radio Legislation, supra note 21. It was suggestd
that the necessary funds could be raised by a tax on the remaining stations.
See Davis, Radio Act of 1927 (1927) 13 VA. L. RLV. 611.
48 Supra note- 24.
49 As far as compensation for stations first licensed under the Act of
1927 is concerned, it would seem to be solely a question of whether it is
required in order to induce private enterprise to enter the broadcasting
business. As yet this has not appeared necessary.
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interests of large stations are concerned. In view of the absolute
necessity for some regulation it is very doubtful whether the
Radio Act of 1927 will be declared unconstitutional when it
comes before the United States Supreme Court. More likely,
the courts will retain the power of passing upon the constitu-
tionality of each case as it arises, either through an interpreta-
tion of the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" formula
or in the general power to overrule arbitrary and unreasonable
orders of an administrative body. Because of the unusually
intricate duties of the Federal Radio Commission it would
seem that its opinion should be entitled to great weight with
the courts. But the General Electric case, as well as the history
of similar commissions,"0 would indicate that such may not be
the result.
THE USE OF THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" CONCEPT IN PRICE-
FIXING CASES
In writing the majority opinion in Williams v. Standard Oil
Co.,' the latest case involving the use of the concept of "affected
with a public interest," Mr. Justice Sutherland produced a sen-
tence which is illustrative of the unavoidable difficulties in-
herent in the judicial use of such vague phrases.2  Admitting
that the phrase is "indefinite," he nevertheless stated that "by
repeated decisions of this court . . . that phrase, however it
may be characterized, has become the established test by which
the legislative power to fix prices of commodities . . . must
be measured." 3 A more frank admission of judicial perplexity
would be hard to discover. Only when a business is "affected
with a public interest" can the legislatures control its price
schedules. And yet not only have the courts found it practically
50 Tollefson, Judicial Review of the Decisions of the Iiterstatc Commorce
Commission (1927) 11 MINN. L. Rav. 389, 504.
' 278 U. S. 235, 49 Sup. Ct. 115 (1929). A Tennessee statute provided
for the fixing by the Commissioner of Finance and Taxation of prices at
which gasoline might be sold, after a due investigation by the Division of
Motors and Motor Fuels. The plaintiff gasoline companies sued to en-
join the enforcement of the act and to have it declared unconstitutional.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision granting the
relief requested on the ground that the business of dealing in gasoline
is not "affected with a public interest" and therefore legislative price-
fixing of this commodity is unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Stone concurred in the
result. Mr. Justice Holmes dissented without opinion.
2 "Affected with a public interest," as a general criterion meaning little
in advance of the decisions, is compdrable to "fair return on fair value,"
"public policy," and "a corporation is an entity separate and distinct from
its shareholders."
3Supra note 1, at 239, 49 Sup. Ct. at 116.
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impossible,' but Mr. Justice Sutherland now implies that it is
immaterial, to characterize and define this phrase. Does this
group of words stand aloof from the rest of our vocabulary,
constituting without rationalization the established key to a
highly important field of decisions? Is it possible to apply a
test when we are ignorant of its content? Or are we to infer
that the majority are assuring us that there is a fundamental
principle and a logical category behind the price-fixing cases,
although precedent requires the use of certain words in the
opinions? Recognizing the illusory, "apologetic" and fictional
characteristics of "affected with a public interest," a number of
writers, as well as the dissenting element in the Supreme Court,
have recommended abandonment of its use as a test in price-
fixing cases. But the tenacity of such phrases in the vocabu-
lary of the law is remarkable, and there is no disputing Mr.
Justice Sutherland in his statement that this one has become
"established"-in effect, written into constitutional law as se-
curely as the "due process" clause which it supplements.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking of the progress made in the
course of judicial decisions, once said that "it is of the essence
of improvement that we should be as accurate as we can." 0
Could Lord Hale have foreseen, when he said that property
"ceases to be juris privati" 7 when it is "affected with a public
4 It is submitted that the stock substitute terminology, such as "quasi-
public" or "devoted to a public use," is of no aid. The standard statement
of the principle, to be found with monotonous regularity in these cases, is
that where the owner of property has devoted it to a use in which the
public has an interest, he has in effect granted to the-public an intere3t
in such use, and must, therefore, to the extent thereof, submit to be con-
trolled by the public for the common good. More intelligible, perhaps,
though not less futile, is the explanation of Garrison, J., in McCarter v.
Fireman's Ins. Co., 74 N. J. Eq. 372, 380, 73 Atl. 80, 83 (1909): "When
the interest of the public has been woven into a business as a sine qua non
of its success, the success thus achieved thrusts upon such busines a co-
ordinate duty that clothes it, to that extent, with a public interest."
See also Mr. Chief Justice Taft in Wolff Packing Co. v. Industrial Court,
262 U. S. 522, 536, 43 Sup. Ct. 630, 633 (1923) : "... the expression 'clothed
with a public interest' means more than the public welfare is affected...
The circumstances . . . must be such as to create a peculiarly clos
relation between the public and those engaged in it, and raise implications
of an affirmative obligation on their part to be reasonable in dealing with
the public.' It seems that the opinions, such as these, which attempt to
rationalize the concept, are of less convincing effect than those which
use the expression as complete in itself.
5 Finkelstein, From Munn v. Illinois to Tyson v. Banton (1927) 27 Coi
L. REy. 769; Holmes, J., and Stone, J., dissenting in Tyson v. Banton,
273 U. S. 418, 445, 447, 47 Sup. Ct. 426, 433, 434 (1927).
6 HoLums, CoLL cnz LEGAL Prmns (1921) 23L
7 De Portibus Mari (1787) 1 HARG. LAW TRAMS 78.
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interest," that Mr. Chief Justice Waite 8 was to adopt his words
as a supposedly rigid test for the constitutionality of legisla-
tive action, it is possible that he would have taken pains to be
more explicit. But, speaking as he did in general terms in
the course of a long treatise so many years ago, the original
import of his words can be significant only as an academic,
historical study. An attempt to pin the cases into a category,
to define the limits of the" doctrine in economic fact, has been
termed "folly" by a recent writer.9 It would, indeed, be a
worthy accomplishment to discover some underlying reaction
conveyed by "affected with a public interest." Perhaps such an
idea exists in the minds of the courts. But the futility of analy-
sis of the individual words is well expressed by the Illinois
court:
"As to what is meant by the word 'public' when used in this
connection, it is very difficult to define or explain it in any
simpler language than by the use of the word 'public' itself." 1I
A chart of the most outstanding decisions in which the "pub-
lic interest" doctrine has been put forward as the criterion 11
reveals in the chronological order a most striking reversal on
the validity of price-fixing legislation. The turning point oc-
curred around 1922.2
8 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113 (1876). As pointed out by the majority,
Lord Hale's expression had been cited before in Alnutt v. Inglis, 12 East
527 (1810) and in Mobile v. Yuille, 3 Ala. N. S. 137 (1841), but Munn
v. Illinois is universally accepted as the starting point of the decisions on
price-fixing in this country. A statute of Illinois fixed a maximum charge
for grain elevators. It was challenged under the "due process" clause and
was upheld by the United States Supreme Court as a reasonable regula-
tion of an industry "affected with a public interest." The decision was
based largely on the ground that the Chicago elevators constituted a "virt-
ual monopoly." But see infra note 14.
9 Keezer, Some Queotions Involved in the Application of the "Public
Interest" Doctrine (1927) 25 MICH. L. REV. 596.
lo See Public Utilities Commission v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 267 Ill.
528, 533, 108 N. E. 716, 718 (1915).
11 The category of industries "affected with a public interest" does not
include, for the purposes of this article, the cases on "public utilities." The
two fields are separate and distinct. See Cotting v. Kansas City Stock-
yards Co., 183 U. S. 79, 93, 22 Sup. Ct. 30, 37 (1901). Likewise, in the
minimum wage cases, though price-fixing decisions, the "public interest"
doctrine did not arise. Stettler v. O'Hara, 243 U. S. 629, 37 Sup. Ct. 475
(1917); Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U. S. 525, 43 Sup. Ct. 394
(1923). It is important to note, however, that the Adkins case resulted in
a judgment against price-fixing which has had an effect upon the delibera-
tions of the Court in subsequent cases turning on "public interest."
12 It is interesting to note that Mr. Chief Justice Taft was appointed
June 30, 1921; Mr. Justice Sutherland, Sept. 18, 1922; Mr. Justice Butler,




Munu v. Illinos (1876)18 Wolff Packing Co. v. I 'm-
trial Court (1923)IT
Brass v. Stoeser (1894)14 Tyson v. Banton (1927)8
German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Ribnik v. McBride (1928)0
Kansas (1914)2 Williams v. Standard Oil Co.
Block v. Hirsh (1921) i0 (1929)20
Grain elevators, fire insurance, and housing were businesses
which happened to come before the Court while belief in the ef-
ficacy of price-fixing was uppermost, and affirmative application
of Lord Hale's doctrine was upheld without exception. But
packers, theatre-ticket scalpeis, employment agents, and gsso-
l8Supra note 8.
14153 U. S. 391, 14 Sup. Ct. 857 (1894). A North Dalota statute rez-
ulating grain elevators, very similar to that in the Munn case, was
before the Court, but the facts showed no condition of "virtual monopoly."
The Court, however, abandoned this as a basis for decision, though it had
been emphasized in the hunn case and reiterated in Budd v. IT. Y, 143
U. S. 517, 12 Sup. Ct. 468 (1892). In so doing, the Court made a generous
concession to legislative discretion.
15 233 U. S. 389, 34 Sup. Ct. 612 (1914). An act of Kansas provided
for the regulation and control of the rates of premiums on fire insurance
contracts. The Court held the business Uaffected with a public inter,-t
as a " necessity to business activity and enterprip," though ther existed
no monopoly and there was no physical "property devoted to a public u."
Cf. Keezer, op. cit supra note 9, at 600-601.
16 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. 458 (1921). The Washing on rent law,
regulating prices for rooms and terms of the leases, was pa'ed by Congres
as a war measure. The majority said that "circumstances have clothed
the letting of buildings with a public interest so great as to justify regu-
lation." Emphasis was placed on the fact that it was a temporary meas-
ure. This case "went to the verge of the law." See Penn. Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 260 U. S. 393, 416, 43 Sup. Ct. 158, 160 (1922).
17Supm note 4. The Supreme Court was called upon to review the
famous Kansas Industrial Relations Act, which placed the production of
food, clothing, fuel and transportation under the control of the Industrial
Court for fixing of wages, arbitration of disputes, etc. The main pur-
pose of the act was to secure continuity in the production of necessities.
The Court refused to further e-xtend the "public interet' concept, denied
that a business could be subject to price-fixing by mere legislative declara-
tion, and held the act unconstitutional It was perhaps a blow to tho
validity of modern price regulation that this particular case vs the
first to come before the new members of the Court. See supra noto 12.
18 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927). A New York statute regulated
the price for which theatre tickets might be resold by licenzsd brokers. Tho
majority held that this was a private business and that violent abuse in
the sale of tickets was not enough to justify price regulation. See Comment
(1927) 36 YALE L. J. 985; Finkelstein, op cit. supra note 5.
19 277 U. S. 350, 48 Sup. Ct 545 (1928). The Court held invalid an
act of New Jersey regulating the fees of private employment agencies
See Comment (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 225.
2 Supra note I
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line dealers pleaded their cases before a Court acting under the
opposite reaction and hence cannot be subjected to legislative
interference.
Mr. Justice Field, vigorously dissenting in the Munn case, de-
plored the destruction "for all useful purposes [of] the efficacy
of the constitutional guaranty" 21 and the dangers of giving "un-
restrained license to legislative will" 22 in regulating the property
and business of citizens. Similarly, Mr. Justice Brewer asked
in a later case if, as a corollary to an apparent vital public inter-
est, "the state may fix the price at which the butcher must sell
his meat, or the vendor of boots and shoes his goods." 23 Still
later the same dissenter urged .that "the country is rapidly
traveling the road which leads to that point where all freedom
of contract and conduct will be lost." 24 In explaining the sudden
change in attitude towards price-fixing in 1922, would it be
possible that the alarmist influence of the strong dissents in the
earlier cases has slowly asserted itself, and that the present
Court has succumbed to the ancient fear of legislative preroga-
tive? In the Wolff Packing Co. case Mr. Chief Justice Taft said:
"Freedom [of contract] is the general rule, and restraint the ex-
ception. The legislative authority to abridge can be justified
only by exceptional circumstances ;" 2 and further on, his .opin-
ion seems to echo from Mr. Justice Brewer: ". . . it has never
been supposed . . . that the business of the butcher, or the
baker, the tailor, the woodchopper . . . or the miner was
clothed with such a public interest that the price of his product
or his wages could be fixed by state regulation." 20 Gasoline
does not come within the phrase "affected with a public inter-
est," according to Mr. Justice Sutherland in the William case,
because it is "one of the ordinary commodities of trade." 21
Undoubtedly, the public mind of this country resents and
dreads each new legislative encroachment upon the course of
private transactions, social relations, and accustomed behaviour.
Regulations, which now seem an ordinary feature of daily life,
21Supra note 8, at 141.
22 Ibid. 148.
23 Budd v. New York, supra note 14, at 550, 12 Sup. Ct. at 478.
24 Brass v. Stoeser, supra note 14, at 410, 14 Sup. Ct. at 864.
25Supra note 4, at 534, 43 Sup. Ct. at 632. The majority opinion hero
cited Adkns v. Children's Hospital, supra note 11.
26Supra note 4, at 537, 43 Sup. Ct. at 633.
27Supra note 1, at 240, 49 Sup. Ct. at 116. In Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Lincoln, 114 Neb. 243, 207 N. W. 172 (1926), the Court refused
to enjoin the defendant municipality from selling gasoline. The purpose
on the city's part was clearly to undersell and force private companies to
lower prices. Thus, there was accomplished indirectly in this case what
could not be done directly under the Williams case.
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attracted at their outset a storm of criticism and deprecation."
It is to be wondered, in view of the last four Supreme Court
decisions, whether, if too much weight is given to the danger of
allowing "the prices of everything, from a calico gown to a
city mansion [to] be the subject of legislative discretion," the
Court will ever again feel at liberty to uphold a price-fixing
law.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to determine the validity
or invalidity of legislation according to the terms of the Consti-
tution. In price-fixing cases, validity is made to turn upon the
"public interest" test. When forced to attempt some explana-
tion of "affected with a public interest," Mr. Justice McKenna
said, "We can best explain by examples," and proceeded to cite
the previous cases2W The Court at that time had before it a
regulation of fire insurance premiums. Relevant "examples"
which could be used to define the category were restricted to
the grain elevator cases. To search for factual characteristics
inherent in the business of fire insurance by which an analogy
could be drawn to the business of storing grain is believed on its
face to be a violation of common sense. But the Court in Mwin
v. Illinois had described the grain elevators, in the sense of
"public interest," as standing at "the very gateway of com-
merce"-a cog in the wheel of daily enterprise which could be
singled out as of commanding importance. The pleadings in
the German Alliance Insurance Co.20 case had disclosed no mono-
polistic situation, nor was there apparent a devotion of tangible
"property" to the public use. But it was easy to state that the
business of fire insurance, though an utterly incomparable cog,
is affected with an equal public interest. Hence, the Court in
turn described it as "a necessity to business activity and enter-
prise," "of the greatest public concern," protecting "a large part
of the country's wealth." By such a process the legislation was
upheld, and the country was brought one "example" nearer to
the alleged doom of the "butcher, baker, wood-chopper, etc." -1
There have been various theories advanced as to the true basis
28 "Against that conservatism of the mind which puts to question every
new act of regulating legislation and regards the legislation invalid or
dangerous until it has become familiar, government . . . has pressed on
in the general welfare . . . The dread of the moment having passed,
no one is now heard to say that rights were restrained or their constitu-
tional guaranties impaired." See German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kan-
sas, su'pra note 15, at 409, 34 Sup. Ct at 618.
29 Ibid. 406, 34 Sup. Ct. at 617.
3o Supra note 15.
31 A recent writer has described this judicial technique as the "every-
little-bit-added-to-what-you've-got-method." And the more conservative
opinion, illustrated by the dissents in the early cases, is that of "behold-
how-great-a-matter-a-litte-fire-kindleth." Robinson, The Public Utility
Cowept in American Law (1928) 41 HARV. L. REv. 277, 288.
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underlying the decisions in which the courts have talked "af-
fected with a public interest." If it' were possible to anticipate
under what circumstances this label would or would not be ap-
Dlied to a particular industry, its formal use as an "established
test" w-ould disturb only the critics of judicial phraseology and
logic. As originally propounded in Munn v. Illinois " and em-
phasized in the related case of Budd v. New York,3 3 the legisla-
tive power to regulate prices charged by grain elevators was
to be restricted to those operating a "virtual monopoly"-con-
trolling, through location or circumstances, the key to the grain
supply of a certain region. But two years later the Supreme
Court failed to discuss this argument of counsel in Brass v.
Stoeser 34 on its merits, the doctrine of the earlier cases being
quite casually enlarged by the statement that the scope of price
control to be exercised was within legislative discretion, once
its power to regulate at all had been upheld. It is here that we
find perhaps the earliest indication of what was to be the judicial
reaction to the "public interest" concept in price-fixing cases.
Any useful guidance that could be obtained from limitation of
the doctrine to monopolistic enterprises was eliminated in this
case. Similarly, when a statute regulating the rates to be
charged for premiums on fire insurance 35 came before the Court,
it was argued that there had been no "tangible property devoted
to a public use," that the statute attempted to fix "the price of a
chose in action," and that for this reason the grain elevator
cases were not authority for the validity of maximum insurance
rates.88 But the Court answered that it is the service rendered,
in which tangible property is but an instrument, that forms the
foundation of the "public interest." Hence private insurance
contracts were held to be as much subject to legislative regula-
tion as the letting of storage room in elevators, and it was made
clear that further efforts to define any limits of the "public inter-
est" doctrine before the Supreme Court would be futile. Hence-
forth, it was to be used as a facile mode of expressing judicial
approval or disapproval of the legislation.
With the arrival of the later price-fixing cases before the
Court, it seems necessary to turn to the dissenting opinions in
an attempt to discover trace of an underlying, predictable line
of thought. It is the belief of Mr. Justice Stone that analysis of
the decisions produces a formula behind "affected with a public
interest" in the failure of the competitive system to maintain
equilibrium between buyers and sellers, the rationale turning
,2Supra note 8. cf. Ainutt v. Inglis, supra note 8.
3 Supra note 14.
'SSupra note 14. The facts in this case disclosed no monopolistic condi-
tions.
85 German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Kansas, supra note 15.
ae cf. dissent of Mr. Justice Lamar, ibid. 418, 34 Sup. Ct. at 621.
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upon the resultant hardship caused to a material body of the
public.3 7 Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinions, written with
this premise, are so comparatively clear-cut and convincing as
to emphasize the futility of fumbling with the "public interest"
doctrine. A query is presented, however, as to the soundness of
this test as to future price-fixing in the light of the view, quite
prevalent at present among economists, that the breakdown of
the competitive system is becoming universal.-3 Assuming this
to be true, will corresponding legislative control take place?
And if so, how much could be accomplished by regulation of
prices alone? The facts of the Ribnik case disclosed a vivid
example of failure of competition to protect the public," but the
remedial legislation was held unconstitutional. And since Mr.
Justice Stone concurred.in the result of the Williams case, we
might assume that he did not find in the facts any important
inequality between buyers and sellers of gasoline. On the other
hand, it is believed possible that a variety of cases may be as
difficult to solve under his test as under the vague "public inter-
est" doctrine, and that there are degrees of breakdown in com-
petition, which in turn would require classification before a
category could be reached.
A recent article 40 condemns the modern majority opinions in
the price-fixing cases as "legal phlogiston," and declares that
the Court has "arrogated to itself a supreme legislative func-
tion," establishing, in effect, a "judicial veto of legislation." It
seems unavoidable that such will be a valid criticism as long as
the majority persists in writing opinions based on "affected
with a public interest," without disclosing whatever practical,
common sense reasons may underlie the decisions. The same
writer expresses faith in the proposition advanced by Mr. Jus-
tice Holmes in the Tyson case "... that, subject to compensa-
tion when compensation is due, the legislature may forbid or
restrict any business when it has a force of public opinion
37 Tyson v. Banton, supra note 18, at 451, 47 Sup. Ct. at 435: "An
examination of the decisions of this court in which price regulation has
been upheld will disclose that the element common to all is the existence
of a situation or a combination of circumstances materially restricting the
regulative force of competition, so that buyers or sellers are placed at
such a disadvantage in the bargaining struggle that serious economic con-
sequences result to a very large number of members of the community."
This view is again expressed by the same justice in Ribnik v. McBride,
supra note 19, at 360, 48 Sup. Ct. at 547.
ss Robinson, in suggesting that the public utility status will necescaril.
be itrposed on more and more businesses, says that "the competency of a
competitive system, based on untrammeled individualism, to do all things
necessary for social good; is no economic maxim of this day, nor is in-
dividualism one of its juristic fetishes." Robinson, op. cit. mupra note 31,
at 283.
9 Cf. Cornment (1928) 38 YALE L. J. 225.
40 Finkelstein, op. cit. supra note 5.
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behind it." 4, If this were coupled with abandonment of the
"public interest" test, as Mr. Justice Holmes recommends, it
seems that the scope of the price-fixing power would be reduced
to a matter of legislative discretion and common sense, with the
Court to insist upon due compensation and to invalidate the
legislation which counsel could prove to be beyond the verge
of practical public necessity. If we could assume that the Court
would allow the legislature likewise to be the judge of when
the competitive system has failed, it is believed that the test
proposed by Mr. Justice Stone reaches substantially the same
result. Obviously the outstanding responsibility for the present
tangled price-fixing situation lies in the Court. The whole ques-
tion might be disposed of by leaving it to be solved by the legis-
lature-a discretionary trial-and-error method.
As to the present situation, from the viewpoint of counsel, it
seems impossible to predict a valid trend of argument and at-
tack for future cases. The police power alone is sufficient to
justify regulation of hours of labor, employer's liability, and
even production methods of many industries. 42  The banking
business was deemed properly subject to regulation in the public
interest on the ground that "the power to compel, beforehand,
cooperation, and thus, it is believed, to make failure unlikely
and general panic almost impossible, must be recognized if gov-
ernment is to do its proper work." 4 But since the decision in
Munn v. Illinois was a somewhat startling innovation, Mr. Chief
Justice Waite felt constrained to adopt the "public interest"
doctrine as support for the majority view. By the process of
"judicial momentum" that doctrine became a test of validity
peculiar only to price-fixing legislation. That a whole line of
decisions can be determined by such nebulous causes is to be de-
plored. It is to be hoped that, beneath the vague phraseology
of the Court, there exists some sympathy with "usage, prevail-
ing morality, preponderant opinion."
41 Tyson v. Banton, supra note 18, at 448, 47 Sup. Ct. at 434.
42 Is not the price a "like term of the same bargain"? Comment (1928)
38 YALE L. J. 225 at 232. "The economic consequences of this [price]
regulation upon individual ownership is no greater, nor is it essentially
different from that inflicted by . . . anti-monopoly laws, Sunday laws,
usury statutes . . . Workmen's Compensation Acts . . . or state pro-
hibition laws . . . or in numerous other cases in which the exercise of
private rights has been restrained in the public interest." Stone J., in
Tyson v. Banton, supra note 18, at 452, 47 Sup. Ct. at 436.
43 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 112, 31 Sup. Ct. 186,
188 (1911). Though not strictly a price-fixing case, most commentators
include this decision among those relevant to the subject. It illustrates
how gracefully a regulation, though based substantially on the public inter-




ELECTION OF REMEDIES BY PARTY DEALING WITH AGENT OF
UNDISCLOSED PRINCIPAL
An agent, A, without disclosing his principal, P, makes a con-
tract with a third party, T. What effect will action by T against
A or P have on his rights against the other? It can at least be
safely asserted that with few exceptions American and English
courts have held that the recovery, irrespective of satisfaction, of
judgment by T against A or P after T was in possession of all
the facts concerning the agency will preclude him from proceed-
ing against the other., The entire theory underlying the respon-
sibility of an undisclosed principal being somewhat of an
anomaly in contract law, it is hard to find a satisfactory analogy
on which to base and extend this rule.2  The two most common
analogies are to cases involving election or merger.3 While
I Kingsley v. Davis, 104 Mass. 178 (1870) ; Georgi v. Texas Co., 225 N. Y.
410, 122 N. E. 238 (1919) ; Codd v. Parker, 97 Md. 319, 55 AtI. 623 (1903) ;
Sessions v. Block, 40 Mo. App. 569 (1890); Rounsaville v. N. C. Insurance
Co., 138 N. C. 191, 50 S. E. 619 (1905); Nail v. Boothe, 265 S. W. 1051
(Tex. Civ. App. 1924); McDevitt v. Correia & Bros., 70 Cal. App. 245, 233
Pac. 381 (1924); Priestly v. Fernie, 3 H. & C. 977 (1863)'; Barrell v.
Newby, 127 Fed. 656 (C. C. A. 7th, 1904) (garnishment held to constitute
election). Contra: Beymer v. Bonsall, 79 Pa. 298 (1875); McLean v. Sex-
ton, 44 App. Div. 520, 60 N. Y. Supp. 871 (2d Dep't 1899); Tew v. Wolf-
sohn, 77 App. Div. 454, 79 N. Y. Supp. 286 (1st Dep't 1902), aff'd on differ-
ent grounds, 174 N. Y. 272, 66 N. E. 934 (1903); First National Bank v.
Wallis, 84 Hun 376 (N. Y. 1895), affd without opinion, 156 N. Y. 663, G0 N.
E. 1117 (1898); Jewell v. Colonial Theater Co., 12 Cal. App. 681, 108 Pac.
127 (1910). But see Montgomery v. Dorn, 25 Cal. App. 666, 670, 145 Pac.
148, 149 (1914); Wright, Undisclosed Principal in California (1917) 5
Calif. L. Rev. 183, 193, n. 38.
As is to be expected when the substantive law is confused, the pro-
cedure under which it operates is rather varied. Many states bold that T
may join A and P in a suit. Election may be required after all the evi-
dence is in, or after verdict and before judgment. Some courts refuse to
permit joinder. Under any theory of election, it would seem fairer not to
force the plaintiff to elect until he knows that P is responsible on the
contract as principal. The question is partly one of the desirability of
alternative pleading. Cf. CLARK, CODE PLE.ADING (1928) 171; Hanldn,
Alternative and Hypothetical Pleadings (1924) 33 YA=s L. J.'365.
The cases on this procedural point are collected in (1926) 24 Mica. L.
REv. 298; Note (1927) 22 ILL. L. REv. 181.
2 Ames, Undisclosed P-rincipal-His Rights and Liabilities (1909) 18
YALE L. J. 443.
3 It has been pointed out that many opinions, stated in terms of election,
in result seem to be based on the theory of merger. Clayton, Elcction
Between the Liability of an Agent and of his Undisclosed Principal (1925)
3 TEx. L. REv. 384; Note (1904) 17 HAIv. L. lucv. 414.
It has been further suggested that merger is the correct theory. Wright,
op. cit. supra note 1, at 193; Clayton, op. cit. supra; 1 WHLJ=0N, COn-
TRACTS (1920) § 289, n. 40. (The procedure of rescission in equity sug-
gested by Mr. Williston would seem unnecessarily cumbersome.) But com-
plete conformity with the theory of merger, would result in decisions thnt
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neither analogy is completely sound, the rule can be easily re-
stated ii! terms of election 4 because of the flexibility of that
word.
It is equally hard to find a premise from which to proceed
which is not merely a statement of a legal result, the precise
question at issue. When an argument is begun by stating that
there is one contract, or two contracts, or a contract of surety-
ship, or an alternative contract, or that P and A are in the posi-
tion of joint tortfeasors, it need go no further,-the conclusion
has been reached. It is the purpose of this article to disregard
such deceptive premises, and proceed to a conclusion based on
the significant facts involved.
One important question remains in orientating the problem.
Does a decision that after recovery of judgment against A, '
can no longer proceed in an independent action against P, pre-
clude all recovery against P? It has been suggested by Ames
that, when A has a right of exonoration against P, this right
should be available to T after judgment against A.,; Thus, joint
responsibility of A and P to T might result if lie brings suit first
against A. This right, however, has been so seldom used as to
have but a negligible bearing on the problem. 7
an unsatisfied judgment against A, taken by T without knowledge of P's
existence or identity, would preclude T from later proceeding against I'.
Such is not, and should not be, the law. Greenburg v. Palmieri, 71 N. J. L.
83, 58 Atl. 297 (1904); Merrill v. Kenyon, 48 Conn. 314 (188(); lhtrper
v. Tiffin National Bank, 54 Ohio St. 425 (1896); Brown v. Reiman, 48 App.
Div. 295, 62 N. Y. Supp. 663 (4th Dep't 1900); Gavin v. Durden Co., 229
Mass. 576, 118 N. E. 897 (1918); Lindquist v. Dickson, 98 Minn. 3"69, 107
N. W. 958 (1906); Auto Parts v. Roberts, 194 Ill. App. 417 (1916); of.
Kendall v. Hamilton, 4 App. Cas. 504 (1879) (but see dissent at 524, 625).
Query as to whether judgment ignorantly taken against A i6 still effective
after election to take judgment against P. See McDevitt v. Correia &
Bros., supra note 1, at 257, 233 Pac. at 386.
4 "Where such party [T], knowing who is the principal, .ues and r.etovers
judgment against the agent (or principal) on the contract, lie is con-
clusively deemed to have elected to give exclusive credit to the agent (or
principal). Where he has not sued the agent (or principal) to judgment,
the question whether he has so elected or not is a question of fact, delwnd
ing on the circumstances of the particular case." BOWSTI;D, A61uXcY ((;tl
ed. 1919) 321.
-, The historical premise underlying this action has been analyzed, ap-
parently without yielding much light on the problem here discussed. Lewis,
The Liability of the Undisclosed Principal in Contract (1909) 9 Co,. L.
REv. 116. In any case, consistency with the past may have no bearing
on expediency.
,;Ames, op. cit. supra note 2.
7 In the only case found, the plaintiff maintain.d the action sucr.-sfully.
Evans v. Pistorino, 245 Mass. 94, 139 N. E. 898 (1923). Another ease may
have raised the question, but it seems more likely that the court referred
to the similar right of a surety or accommodation party on a negotiable
instrument, a question apparently excluded on the pleadings. Hoffman v.
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It is submitted that there are two distinct situations unfairly
lumped under the one rule under consideration.8 In one, A
deals with T without disclosing the fact that he is only an agent,
and T therefore assumes that A is the principal in the transac-
tion and deals with him as such. If this deception causes loss
to T, the law should go further to protect him than in the other
case where T knows that A is an agent, but does not know for
whom. Under the latter circumstances, at least, had T desired
joint responsibility of A and P, he could have demanded it in
his contract, or indeed he could have refused to deal with A until
P's identity had been disclosed 9
(1) T deals with A believing that A is tlhe pricipal in the
transaction. The following situation tests the doctrine of elec-
tion under circumstances in which it vitally affects the rights
of the parties. P, with little or no credit or assets, wishes
to purchase some goods or property. A, with good credit
and some assets, is sent to T to buy in his own name. The
vendor, T, presumably believes that in selling to A he vill
have as property subject to possible execution for the purchase
price the goods he has delivered or the proceeds of their sale
by A, plus the rest of A's assets, which should be sufficient to
cover depreciation in the goods or land conveyed, or loss from an
unfortunate sale. When T is not paid, he investigates the situa-
tion preparatory to suit, and finds that the assets on which he
counted are still in A's possession, but that the goods delivered,
Anderson, 112 Ky. 813, 67 S. W. 49 (1902). This action may not be practi-
cal because P may have defenses against A which are not available against
T, e.g., payment. See infra note 25. It has been suggested that the equity
procedure involved makes it cumbersome. 2 MECHEa, AcENCY (2d ed.
1914) 1315, n. 49.
An analogy to a similar situation indicates that the courts might be
willing thus to evade a rule by resorting to a different procedure. In
cases in which A signs a sealed instrument in his own name, many courts
refuse to permit an action on the contract by T against P, but still, where
P has received a benefit, permit a quasi-contractual remedy. Cf. Donner
v. Whitecotton, 201 Mo. App. 443, 212 S. W. 378 (1919) ; Crowley v. Lewis,
239 N. Y. 264, 146 N. E. 374 (1925).
8 That no such distinction is used with respect to this question of elec-
tion, see BarreH v. Newby, supra note 1, with which compare Kingsley v.
Davis, supra note 1. See also other cases on the question of election cited
throughout this article.
9 It has been suggested that this distinction might well be used as a
test of whether P may rely on payment to A as a defense against T. The
courts have refused to apply this test. Irvine v. Watson, 5 Q. B. D. 102
(1879), aff'd, 5 Q. B. D. 414 (1880) (compare the decision of the lower
court by Bowen, T., with that of Bramwell, L. J., above); see 1 Wnmspori,
CoNTRACTs (1920) § 283; Mechem, The Liability of an Urdisclosed Princi-
pal (1910) 23 HARv. L. Rzv. 513, 529.
This distinction has also been proposed as a test of whether an auctioneer
warrants his principal's titip -tnn v. Cambell. 2 K. R A1l AOn tiqqSir
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on which he also counted, are in P's possession." Shall the courts
here permit T to realize completely on his original bargain by
permitting joint and several judgments against A and P, or
shall the courts apply the doctrine of election so as to permit A
and P to prevent T from applying to the payment of his judg-
ment all the assets upon which he justifiably counted? It is
submitted that T has acted reasonably, has been unable to pro-
tect himself, and should therefore be permitted to recover judg-
ment against both A and P.11
The New York and Kentucky courts have taken some steps,
possibly feeble and inconsistent, to protect T under the circum-
stances just described. The Kentucky court has held that, when
either A or P is bankrupt, the presentation and settlement of
a claim against that bankrupt discharges the other party only
to the extent of the amount paid.12 Apparently, however, if T
has to enforce his claim by a judgment, or if the bankruptcy is
delayed until after a judgment, this judgment will terminate his
rights against the other party to the satisfaction of the remain-
der of his claim. 13 In the New York case of Glacrm ,. O'Brien,"'
T, believing A to be the principal, sued him to judgment. This
10 The illustration used is restricted in its application to cases in which
a benefit has passed between the parties. It involves an action for the
price, not an action for non-acceptance, an executed, not an executory,
contract. The conclusions reached are therefore similarly restricted,
though the writer believes that they may be possible of extension into the
other field.
Election may work hardship, though not equally undeserved, in cases
in which, after disclosure of P's existence and identity, T chooses to sue
the poorer of the two possible defendants. In such a case as Georgi v.
Texas Co., supra note 1, T seems to have unnecessarily injured himself
by pursuing the wrong debtor, the Texas Co. being quite solvent. In this
situation there is, of course, less reason for asking a court to interfere to
protect T.
1 Cf. the fact situations in Kayton v. Barnett, 116 N. Y. 625, 23 N. E.
24 (1889); Morel v. Westmoreland [1904] A. C. 11; Beymer v. Bonsall,
supra note 1; Harper v. Tiffin National Bank, supra note 3; Lindquist v.
Dickson, supra note 3. Ames' theory might relieve this situation in many
cases by creating in effect joint responsibility. Ames, op. cit. supra note 2.
12 Jones v. Johnson, 86 Ky. 530, 6 S. W. 582 (1888); Hoffman v. Ander-
son, supra note 7. In both these cases, moneys procured on the credit of
the agent were turned over to the P bank.
23 See Bell v. Borders, 205 Ky. 181, 183, 265 S. W. 514 (1924).
Should there be a distinction between the effect in this respect of a
judgment of a court and the allowance of a claim in bankruptcy? See Scarf
v. Jardine, 7 App. Cas. 345 (1882). May not the difference between the
results reached in these Kentucky cases, and in Barrell v. Newby, supra
note 1, be the considerations of fairness which this article attempts to set
out?
'. 117 Misc. 319, 191 N. Y. Supp. 182 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1921). Contra:
Love v. St. Joseph Stockyards, 51 Utah 305, 169 Pac. 951 (1917) ; see (1922)
22 COL. L. REV. 474.
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judgment remained unsatisfied. T then discovered that the P
company was the real principal, and brought suit against it. It
settled T's claim out of court by part payment. New evidence
having arisen, the judgment against A -was reopened. A claimed
that the partial settlement resulting in the complete release of
the P company discharged him completely. The court held that
A was not relieved except to the extent of the P company's settle-
ment. Had T recovered judgment against the P company, how-
ever, and then accepted the same partial settlement, A would
presumably have been relieved of all duty to pay.2 Nor could T
have apportioned the debt between A and P, and forced each to
pay in a separate suit what he should or could l Assuming
the equity of these New York and Kentucky cases, they are not
a complete or a satisfactory solution of this problem, as in many
cases T will be unable to get even a partial settlement without
suit to judgment, which, as above indicated, would ordinarily
constitute an election."
(2) T deals with A kno7wing that he is an agent but ignorant
of his principal's identity. Brokerage transactions are usually
of this type. A rule of the London Stock Exchange provides
that at the end of the day buying and selling customers shall be
given each other's names by the brokers, i.e., the agents shall.
disclose their principals. These principals are then given ten
days in which to decide whether they wish to hold the broker
(jobber) or the ultimate purchaser or seller.", This election,
once made, is final.' Even in hard cases the English courts
have upheld, as reasonable and just, this rule requiring early
election, on the grounds that no one was deceived, and that if
T wished another type of responsibility, he should have so pro-
vided in his contract.2 0
In a similar transaction on the New York Stock Exchange,
where there is no rule requiring election at any time, it was
held that T, having garnished some of the debts of the broker, A,
and having appropriated some of A's money, was thereby pre-
cluded from maintaining suit against P.21 The court said that
15 Georgi v. Texas Co., supra note 1. The fact situation here might
-well justify the holding. See supra note 10.
16 Booth v. Barron, 29 App. Div. 66, 51 N. Y. Supp. 391 (4th Dep't 1898).
27 An argument in favor of the apparently inconsistent results reached
might be based on the conservation of the court's time. See Barrell v.
Newby, supra note 1, at 661. But see dissent in Kendall v. Hamilton,
supra note 3, at 524.
i8 Cf. Irvine v. Watson, supra note 8, at 103.
19 Grissell v. Bristowe, L. R. 4 C. P. 36 (1869); Maxted v. Paine, L. R.
4 Ex. 203 (1869).
0 Supra note 19.
21. Barrell v. Newby, supra note 1. But cf. Cobb v. Knapp, '71 N. Y.
348 (1877) (influenced by Beymer v. Bonsall, supra note 1).
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if T wished joint responsibility he should have so contracted.2
Courts properly seem to feel that in such cases an early election
robs T of none of his rights and relieves A or P of an unneces-
sary burden. A broker's function is to bring together buyer
and seller, and not to become a permanent guarantor of the
transaction. To permit such responsibility to continue indef-
initely seems still more unfair when it is considered that he no
longer has any control over the performance of the contract.
The same reasoning applies with equal force to auctioneers
who sell for principals, or to professional bidders who bid for
them.23 In an English case the court used this reasoning to
limit such an auctioneer's warranty of title, holding that when
he had closed the bargain, brought buyer and seller together,
and made delivery as specified, he had performed his function
according to the understanding of the parties.24
A7hother evil in failing to require timely election by T is that
P cannot be safe in paying to A. Though the exact state of the
rule as to when payment of A by P constitutes a discharge is in
doubt, it is obvious that it is dangerous to pay off a factor or
other agent before knowledge that he has paid T 21 or that T
has conclusively elected to hold only A. Since this is true, busi-
ness convenience of both buyer and seller demands that the
responsibility be fixed on one party as soon as possible, where
it is not unjust to do so. In cases such as the ones just discussed,
where all the parties anticipated an eventual election, there can
be little unfairness in requiring an early choice.
This brief analysis of two types of fact situations would seem
to indicate the undesirability of the generalization that in all
cases a judgment obtained against either A or P constitutes an
election. It is believed that in the type case discussed in which
T did not know that he was dealing with an undisclosed principal
courts should allow a judgment in a direct action against both
A and p.26 It is admitted that such a holding would result in
a rule less mechanical and harder to apply than the one in
22 Barrell v. Newby, supra note 1, at 660.
23 Bell v. Borders, supra note 12.
24 Benton v. Campbell, supra note 8.
Many auction cases of a similar type are decided on the related question
of what constitutes disclosure of the principal. Meyer v. Redmond, 205
N. Y. 478, 98 N. E. 906 (1912) ; Mercer v. Leihy, 139 Mich. 447, 102 N. W.
972 (1905) ; or on the question of mutual alteration of the memorandum of
sale amounting to a novation. Bell v. Borders, supra note 12.
2,Heald v. Kenworthy, 10 Ex. 740 (1855); Armstrong v. Stokes, L. R.
7 Q. B. 598 (1872); Irvine v. Watson, supra note 8; Mechem, op. cit.
supra note 8; (1920) 18 MICH. L. REv. 343.
26 A possible objection to such a holding is that T might secure two trials
on the question of whether there was any contract at all between any of the
parties or whether there was any breach.
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use, but it is believed that justice to T requires this change.
On the other hand, it seems that business convenience requires
an earlier limiting of responsibility in cases involving broiers,
auctioneers, factors, and similar agents if, in these cases, T was
aware that he was dealing with an undisclosed principal and
would therefore, under the prevailing rule, be forced to make
an eventual election.
VOTING RIGHTS OF BORROWING SHAREHOLDERS IN BUILDING AND
LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
The ultimate control of a corporation lies with those who have
a right to vote in the selection of its directors and in the direct
determination of certain of its major policies., The problem of
properly placing that control, once considered as simple as were
the corporate forms themselves, has attained major proportions
as the internal financial structures of the business units have
increased in complexity.2 Not the least of the difficulty lies in
the fact that the legal framework is still based on outworn as-
sumptions, perhaps warranted by the older and simpler struc-
tures in which the shareholders were usually a compact group
of mutual entrepreneurs, so that statutory and judicial interpre-
tation is often years behind actual corporate practice.3 The com-
plications involved in the proper allocation of ultimate corporate
control, and the magnification of these complications by a re-
stricted legal perspective, are both brought into strong relief
by a recent Maryland case.4
In the course of a dispute between two factions for the control
of a building and loan association, the question arose as to the
right of "borrowing stockholders" to vote, and consequently to
27 If the third party fails to act, and there is no agreement interpreting
his silence, query as to how he should be presumed to have elected. See 2
MECHEM, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 1751.
3 Spe Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., 111 Va. 1, 27,
68 S. E. 412, 421 (1910); FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS (1917) § 1726; CcoN,
CORPORATIONS (8th ed. 1923) § 588; THOMPSON, CORPORATIONS (3d ed.
1927) § 896.
2 For specific statements see Douglas, A Functional Approach to the Law
of Business Associations (1929) 23 ILL. L. REV. 673, 678; DEWING, FINAN-
CIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS (1926) xviii; HAMILTON An W1IGuT, A WAY
OF ORDER FOR BIruMINoUS COAL (1928) 262 et acq.
3 See VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP (1923) 5; BE= , STUDIS IN THE
LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE (1928) vi.
4 First Mortgage Bond Homestead Association v. Baker, 145 AtI. 876
(Md. 1929). It is significant that Maryland is considered one of the "lib-
eral" states in its attitude toward corporation law. See BE=, op. cit.
supra note 3, at 30.
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receive notice of stockholders' meetings.5 In accordance with the
working plan of the association,6 these borrowers, in order to
obtain their loans, had each subscribed to shares of the associa-
tion equal in total par value to the amounts of the respective
loans. No distinction was made in the by-laws between these
shares and the shares issued to regular investing shareholders,
and both the borrowing and investing shareholders were to pay
for their shares in monthly instalments.7 The instalments paid
by the holders of borrowers' shares [hereafter called borrowers]
were to include, however, interest on the loans received and cer-
tain other property expenses, along with the regular "dues" paid
by the holders of the investors' shares [hereafter called in-
vestors]. Moreover, the borrowers were not to participate in
the profits of the association., Ultimately, however, the loans
were not made by the association. The borrowers, as well as
subscribing to shares, signed bonds to be sold by the association
to third persons, and these bonds were secured by mortgages to
be held by the association in trust for the bondholders. The
monthly payments of the borrowers were then accumulated in a
sinking fund and used in the general corporation business until
the shares were fully paid for, at which time the shares, classed
as "redeemed" 9 from the time when the loans were made, would
5 Although the case was actually decided on other grounds, namely the
right of "investing shareholders" to receive notice of meetings, the court
thought the point concerning borrowers' voting rights sufficiently important
to warrant full consideration and determination "for possible bearing on
action taken subsequently by the contending factions." The unique char-
acter of the particular question involved and the entire absence of judicial
authority on the subject point to it as one of the "ever-increasing range
of problems arising out of new forms of securities and contracts" concern-
ing which, according to Berle, "precedents simply do not exist." BERLE, op.
cit. supra note 3, at vii.
6 A detailed description of the business and methods of the association,
including quotations from the printed forms that it used, may be found in
First Mortgage Bond Homestead Association v. Mehlhorn, 133 Md. 439, 105
Atl. 526 (1919), and in First Mortgage Bond Homestead Association v.
Nelson, 151 Md. 181, 135 Atl. 139 (1926).
7 This method of payment for shares is characteristic of building and
loan associations, and its advantageous use was one of the main reasons
for their institution. See ENDLICII, BUILDING AsSOCIATIONS (2d ed. 1895)
6 et seq.
8 The by-laws of the association and the application forms for loans
suggested loans on other than the "drop-interest" plan; but actually all
loans were made on that plan, whereby the borrowers were to forego all
interest in the association's profits, although they were to be credited with
interest on their instalments after they had paid in a certain amount.
9 In the terminology of building associations, a share is said to be "re-
deemed" when a loan is advanced to the holder of that share by virtue of
his being its holder. ENDLICH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 12. That such a
share is not considered to be retired is indicated by the fact that, in the
absence of statute, the holder of "redeemed" shares is ordinarily said to be
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be definitely retired. Then the value of the shares, instead of
being refunded to the shareholders themselves, as would be done
in the case of investors, at full payment and consequent retire-
ment of their stock, was to be paid by the association to the bond-
holders to retire the borrowers' bonds.
The court denied these borrowers the right to vote their shares
or to receive notice of meetings, basing this denial primarily on a
statute ,o dealing with building and loan associations. But a
contention that the additional charter powers 1' of the corpora-
tion placed it outside the strict category of building and loan
associations forced the court to extend the basis of its denial to
broader grounds. The argument for the borrowers' rights pro-
ceeded from this contention to a claim of those rights under the
general corporation statute 2 entitling all shareholders to notice
of meetings. But the court, refusing to be blinded by a "strange
use of names," maintained that the instant borrowers were not
the sort of shareholders to whom the statute was intended to
apply. Instead of being investors their "only relation to the cor-
poration" was that of debtors; indeed, they were "not even
debtors of the corporation." Therefore, said the court, they were
in no way entitled to participate in the management of the as-
sociation.
Upon analysis, lowever, it would appear that the borrowers'
relation to the association was more nearly that of creditors. Al-
though they were not to participate in the profits of the associa-
tion, and although they were at all times responsible to the third
party bondholders for the full amounts of their loans, the pay-
ments which were ultimately to retire the bonds were accumu-
lating in the treasury of the association. Moreover, in the col-
lection of these instalments, the association was expressly made
entitled to participate in the profits and in the management of the associa-
tion. See Mechanics Building and Loan Association v. Conover, 14 N. J. Eq.
219, 226 (1862); Lister v. The Log Cabin Building Association, 38 Md.
115, 120 (1873); H61t v. Aetna Building and Loan Association, '78 Okla.
307, 310, 190 Pac. 872, 875 (1920) ; Bayless v. Baird, 110 Ohio St. 305, 308,
143 N. E. 703 (1924).
lo MD. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, § 169, providing that "members
of such corporations so redeeming their -aid share or shares of stock shall
cease to be stockholders, and shall not be entitled to vote at any meeting
i It would seem not unlikely that the legislature may here have uscd
the word "redeeming" loosely as synonymous with "retiring," and over-
looked its specific connotation with regard to building associations, par-
ticularly in view of the earlier judicial attitude in Maryland. Cf. note
9, supra. The possibility of such ambiguity lends further force to the
argument for disregard of the statute in the instant case.
11 The association was incorporated under a special act of 1910 [c. 242]
granting it additional powers not ordinarily exercised by building associa-
tions.
12 D. ANN. CODE (Bagby, 1924) art. 23, §§ 17, 19.
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the agent of the borrowers, so that no risk of non-repayment
should fall on the lenders."3 Nor did any risk lie on the associa-
tion, for it was protected against default in payment by the
mortgages on the borrowers' property which it held in trust for
the bondholders. The only real risk lay on the borrowers them-
selves, for in the event of insolvency of the association, they
would still be liable to the full amounts of their bonds. Thus
their relation to the association would seem most nearly to re-
semble that of creditors, to the sum of their paid instalments.
The court was quick to perceive that the borrowing sharehold-
ers were not such investors as were originally intended by the
general statute to be insured a voice in the corporate manage-
ment. It apparently was not moved by the realization that the
statute was undoubtedly based on the venerable assumption that
ownership (as typified in the traditional shareholding entre-
preneur) and control must be united, and that such an assump-
tion has proved too inflexible to be universally applicable in mod-
ern business practice.' There was no inherent reason why these
borrower-creditors should have been denied a voice in the con-
trol. Their interest in the protection of their instalments was
just as great as the interest of the other shareholders in the pro-
tection of their investments. Moreover, the idea of giving voting
rights to creditors is not new. There is active statutory 115 and
passive judicial"6 authority for the issuance of voting bonds. 1" In
yet another sense, the borrowers were customers of the building
and loan association; and the idea of partial consumer control,
without the customarily attendant investment and "part owner-
ship," has not only been developed in theory 18 but applied in
practice. 9
Modern corporate practice is frequently forced to adopt intri-
13 See First Mortgage Bond Homestead Association v. Nelson, supra note
6, at 184, 135 Atl. at 140.
14 Cf. Carnegie Trust Co. v. Security Life Insurance Co., supra note 1,
at 20, 69 S. E. at 418; Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, 25 F. (2d) 783, 786 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1928); VEBLEN, 10c. cit. supra note 3; Ballantine, Riplcy's Indict-
ment of Corporate Skullduggery (1928) 17 CALIF. L. REV. 35, 39.
15 Examples of statutes allowing the grant of voting rights to bond-
holders are DEL. REV. CODE (1915) § 1943; VA. GEN. LAWS (1923) § 3808;
OHIO GENERAL CORPORATION ACT (1927) § 77.
16 Cf. State v. McDaniel, 22 Ohio St. 354 (1872) ; New England Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Phillips, 141 Mass. 535, 6 N. E. 534 (1886). Contra:
Durkee v. People ex rel. Askren, 155 Ill. 354, 40 N. E. 626 (1895) (issue
of voting bonds held unconstitutional).
17 For a brief discussion of the desirability of voting bonds, see DEWING,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 104-106.
28 See HAMILTON AND WRIGHT, op. Cit. supra note 2, c. viii.
19 The Dutchess Bleachery at Wappinger's Falls, N. Y., provides that
one member of its board of directors shall be a representative of the com-
.munity which it serves. The plan is described in SELERKMAN, SHARING
MANAGEMENT WITH THE WORKERS (1924).
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cate devices in order to comply with at least the letter of anti-
quated laws. 20 In the case under discussion, the court, had it so
desired, might have foregone the strict statutory interpretation
and granted the borrowers their asserted rights as nominal
shareholders.21 The means by which to circumvent a legal prin-
ciple of no present utility was in the court's hands. Moreover,
it is not unlikely that a court which looks through words only
to apply obsolete theories might similarly brush aside the pur-
poseful devices with which modern business evades the fallacies
behind persistent statutory relics. It is true that many of these
devices are eventually given supplementary statutory recogni-
tion.22 But it would seem that realization of inevitable legislative
delay in patching up an outworn structure to conform with pres-
ent-day usage should lead to judicial disregard of the encumber-
ing statute wherever possible. Thus, in the instant case, whatever
the ultimate decision, the court might well have considered the
facts from a less artificial angle, so that the voting privilege
would have been granted or denied in contemplation of the cred-
itor relationship and of the consequent contractual 2 3 or equitable
rights of the borrowers.
20 Among the most common of the devices referred to are cumulative
voting, non-voting stock, no-par stock, pooling agreements, and voting
trusts. Their purposes range from the provision for minority represcnta-
tion in management to concentration even of residual corporate control for
the sake of efficiency. They are discussed at length in DEWING, op. cit. supra
note 2; BuaLu, op. cit. oupr note 3; RILEY, MAIN ST=,r AD WALL
STREET (1927). And see Book Review (1929) 42 HAV. L. REV. 714, 717.
21 Cf. Holmes, J., dissenting, in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438,
469, 48 Sup. Ct. 564, 574 (1928), wherein it is pointed out that in the
absence of precedent as to the interpretation of a written law, "logical do-
duction" is unnecessary, and that the choice should be made directly of the
more desirable end to be achieved.
22 Cumulative voting, non-voting stock, and no-par stock are now provided
for by statute in most states. Voting trusts have also been given statutory
sanction. N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1923) c. 60, § 50; DEL. LAWS (1925)
§ 1932; OHio GENERAL COROR&TION ACT (1927) § 34.
23 On the contractual basis of intra-corporate relations, cf. BERLE, op. Cit.
supra note 3, especially at 23 et seq. And see Ballantine, op. cit. Sura note
14, at 38.
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